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Timothy J. Bartik and Kevin M. Hollenbeck
Employment Effects of 
the Washington High 
Technology Business and 
Occupation Tax Credit
This article summarizes findings from Upjohn 
Institute Working Paper No. 12-187. Visit www
.upjohn.org to read the paper.
Washington State has a High 
Technology Business and Occupation 
Tax Credit that allows a credit against the 
state’s gross receipts tax for firms that 
exceed a certain threshold of qualified 
research and development (R&D) 
spending. A major purpose of this credit 
is to stimulate employment growth. In 
spring 2012, the Joint Legislative Audit 
and Review Committee of the state 
legislature contracted with the Upjohn 
Institute to conduct a study that would 
estimate the extent to which the High 
Tech Tax Credit does, in fact, stimulate 
employment growth.
To address this question, we used tax 
return data from firms that claimed a tax 
credit on their business and occupation 
tax returns between 2004 and 2009. Com-
panies that claim the credit must also file 
the state’s Annual Tax Incentive Survey, 
and we used that survey data as well. 
Self-Reported Employment Creation
One question on the Tax Incentive 
Survey asks firms to report “the amount 
of credit claimed for the calendar year,” 
and another question asks “how many 
new employment positions did your firm 
create in Washington State during the 
calendar year?” Table 1 summarizes these 
survey data by year.
Interpreted naively, these data might 
seem to indicate that the credit is very 
cost-effective in creating jobs. If one 
assumes that all the employment created 
in these firms was due to the credit, then 
the credit cost per job created is low, 
averaging less than $2,000 annually per 
job-year (for example, the total credit 
cost over all years of about $123 million 
divided by about 74,000 jobs yields a 
cost per job-year of $1,662). 
Models
Table 1 does not reveal, however, 
whether the tax credit created the 
reported employment. Does causality run 
from the credit to employment growth 
or from growth to more credits claimed? 
Firms that are expanding may choose to 
spend some of their additional revenue on 
R&D, thereby increasing credits claimed. 
Alternatively, the tax credit may incent 
firms to invest in R&D, which increases 
employment. Without further evidence, 
we cannot determine the direction of 
causation.
Unraveling the direction of causality is 
the key to estimating the effect of the tax 
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credit on employment. In this study we 
identified causation through instrumental 
variables, which cause shifts in R&D 
credits for the firms that are unrelated to 
the firm’s own decisions. 
Our model assumes that a firm’s hiring 
decisions are based on its profits. Profits 
are negatively related to costs, so hiring 
is negatively related to a firm’s costs. The 
high tech tax credit influences a firm’s 
decision making by reducing the cost of 
R&D. We assume that the effect of the 
R&D subsidy on business location and 
expansion decisions is proportional to 
this subsidy’s effects on business costs. 
The outcomes that we have analyzed 
include employment and overall wages 
paid at the firm. We examined how 
changes in the credit subsidy affect the 
firm’s growth in employment or wages, 
and we estimated our model using firms’ 
average credit ratios and marginal credit 
ratios. The latter is the additional tax 
credit that would be earned by spending 
one additional dollar on R&D. For many 
firms, these two ratios are the same—
equal to the credit subsidy rate for that 
industry and year. However, because the 
credit is nonrefundable, the marginal 
credit ratio drops to 0 if the amount of 
the credit for which the firm is eligible 
exceeds its tax liability, or if the firm’s 
computed tax credit exceeds $2 million.
Hypotheses
We structure our empirical model 
around how the R&D credit lowers a 
business’s costs. The research literature 
on state and local business taxes suggests 
that the long-run effects of a 10 percent 
increase in all state and local business 
taxes is to reduce a location’s business 
activity by between 1 and 6 percent 
(Bartik 1991). Because state and local 
business taxes have usually averaged 
around 5 percent of business costs in the 
United States, this implies that a one-
half of a 1 percent increase in business 
costs (a 10 percent increase in business 
taxes when business taxes are 5 percent 
of overall costs) will reduce business 
activity by between 1 and 6 percent, and 
therefore a 1 percent increase in business 
costs will reduce business activity by 
between 2 and 12 percent. Our model is 
structured so that the R&D credit variable 
is scaled by its effects on business costs, 
so we would expect the credit variable to 
have a coefficient of between −2 and −12. 
Scaling the credit by effects on business 
costs means that the credit price is scaled 
by the firm’s R&D spending as a share of 
total costs, which is what economists call 
R&D’s “factor share.” 
We tried three different instrumental 
variables for the R&D factor share: 
1) the average R&D factor share in 
Washington in an industry where the 
average was calculated by omitting the 
firm; 2) the national R&D factor share 
for the industry using data from the 
National Science Foundation; and 3) the 
firm’s projected factor share in a year, in 
which the projection was accomplished 
by applying the national rate of R&D 
expenditure growth in the industry (from 
the National Science Foundation [NSF] 
data) to the firm’s factor share in the first 
year of data.1 All of these instrumental 
variables are designed to predict a 
firm’s R&D spending and credit but be 
independent of the firm’s own changing 
decisions. The third instrument has the 
most variability because it incorporates 
the most firm-specific information, which 
should increase prediction in estimation.
In theory, average credit rates would 
be germane to a major location decision. 
If decision makers at a firm are trying to 
decide whether to locate in Washington, 
then they might compare the net tax 
rates from several jurisdictions as part 
of their decision-making process, and 
in Washington that would include the 
average credit rate. However, if they are 
making decisions at the margin, such as 
expanding R&D or employment, then 
they are going to respond to the marginal 
tax and credit rates. 
Table 2 shows the estimation results 
for models in which employment growth 
and earnings growth are explained 
by changes in R&D costs, using the 
marginal credit ratio, for the three sets 
of instrumental variables. Our preferred 
specification is using the instrumental 
variable that is presented in the third 
column, that is, using a baseline R&D 
factor share and inflating it annually 
at the rate of growth of R&D in the 
industry, as these estimates are the most 
precise. 
To estimate the job growth that 
resulted from the tax credit, we used the 
firms’ data and the parameters from our 
preferred estimated model with the actual 
marginal credit ratio and with a marginal 
credit rate of 0 to predict employment 
growth with and without the credit.2 We 
did a similar calculation for total wages at 
the firm. Table 3 presents these results. 
As seen in the table, the number of 
jobs created by the tax credit annually 
ranged between about 380 and about 
510, which represented a growth in 
jobs at these firms of between 0.53 and 
0.62 percent. The amount of earnings 
generated in the state from these jobs 
ranges from about $14.2 million to 
$23.0 million. The levels of earnings 
represented a growth in earnings of 
between 0.20 and 0.25 percent.3 We 
calculate the average cost per job created 
by dividing the entries in the last column 
of Table 3 by the jobs created in the 
second column. These averages range 
from $40,409 (2006) to $50,291 (2009). 
The job creation numbers reported 
in Table 3 are job-years created—they 
should not be interpreted as additional 
Table 1  Self-Reported Employment Creation and Tax Credit, by Year
Year
Average 
employment 
created
Total 
employment 
created
Average 
credit ($) 
Total credits taken 
($, millions)
2004 5.39 3,223 39,611 23.687
2005 31.07 16,622 31,003 16.587
2006 27.49 13,937 34,229 17.354
2007 27.05 14,309 37,499 19.837
2008 33.17 16,885 43,599 22.192
2009 18.25 9,305 46,696 23.815
All years 23.30 74,281 38,730 123.472
SOURCE: Washington Tax Incentive Survey.
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permanent jobs created each year. Our 
model estimates that a change in the 
tax credit causes a once-and-for-all 
permanent change in the number of jobs 
in the state. Therefore, the job-years 
listed in the second column should not 
be summed to get a cumulative total of 
jobs created. In other words, our model 
estimates that if policymakers had 
eliminated the tax credit in 2009, the 
level of jobs in these firms would have 
been permanently lower by 484 jobs. 
Furthermore, only about 40 percent 
of the employment creation in this 
study occurred in industries that would 
be expected to be “export-based” 
industries, that is, to primarily sell 
goods and services outside the state of 
Washington. For non-export-based firms, 
any expansion of the firms receiving 
the tax credit would likely reduce sales 
of other firms in that same industry in 
Washington, as they are competing for 
the same Washington customers, with 
little net effects on state employment. If 
there is a multiplier of 2.0 for the export-
based firms, and 0.0 for the non-export-
based firms, the net employment creation 
would be approximately 80 percent as 
large as the numbers in Table 3. 
Conclusion
Our analyses of tax credit data suggest 
that the Washington high tech R&D 
tax credit does increase employment 
to a very modest extent. The analyses 
suggest that, because of the tax credit, 
employment grew by between 0.5 and 0.6 
percent at the firms that claimed credits. 
Our preferred specification suggests that 
firms respond to the marginal credit rate, 
which we should note is zero for slightly 
less than one-quarter of the sample. 
The cost per job created implied by 
these estimates is relatively high. The 
range in the above estimates is from just 
over $40,000 to just over $50,000 per 
job created. Although the jobs created 
may pay more than those figures, not all 
earnings generated are a pure benefit. We 
know from previous studies that only a 
portion of newly created jobs actually 
result in increased local employment 
rates and earnings per capita. Up to four-
fifths of all new jobs in a state will end 
up being reflected in higher population 
rather than higher state employment rates. 
That is, a 1 percent increase in a state’s 
employment is estimated to lead after 5 
or more years to a 0.8 percent increase in 
state population, with a resulting increase 
of 0.2 percent in the state’s employment 
to population ratio (Bartik 1991, 1993). 
Some of the new jobs will also help state 
residents advance to better-paying jobs 
than would have occurred otherwise, as 
the new jobs make it easier for them to 
be hired in better-paying occupations. 
Estimates suggest that a 1 percent 
increase in a state’s employment leads 
to a 0.2 percent increase in earnings per 
capita due to state residents moving up to 
better-paying occupations (Bartik 1991). 
Combining these two effects, a 1 
percent increase in jobs, which would 
directly increase state earnings by 1 
percent if the jobs pay similarly to the 
average state job, will actually lead to a 
somewhat lower 0.4 percent increase in 
state earnings per capita: 0.2 percent due 
to higher state employment rates, and 0.2 
percent due to state residents moving up 
to better-paying occupations. The boost 
in state earnings of 0.4 percent is 40 
percent of the 1 percent extra earnings 
directly associated with the new jobs. 
Therefore, in evaluating the benefits for 
state residents from new jobs, only about 
40 percent of the earnings from the new 
jobs lead to higher earnings per capita for 
state residents. 
Why is the cost per job created in 
this study relatively high? Four reasons 
seem most important. First, this study 
finds that, consistent with the research 
literature, state and local business activity 
is only modestly responsive to lower 
costs. Second, for the firms receiving this 
particular tax credit, the ratio of earnings 
and output to employment is relatively 
high, which implies that a given dollar 
tax credit has more modest percentage 
Table 2  Effects of Changes in R&D Credit Subsidies on an Individual Firm’s Growth
Dependent variable/model
Instrumental variable
Industry 
average
(without firm)
National 
R&D factor share 
growth rate
Baseline factor 
share growing at 
national rate
Employment/growth −10.44
(8.06)
−2.02
(6.32)
−4.94***
(1.92)
Earnings/growth −13.14
(10.68)
−2.64
(8.21)
−2.90
(2.42)
NOTE: Entries are estimated effects of a credit subsidy on firm growth, scaled so that it shows the 
percentage effects on firm growth of an increase in the credit subsidy received of 1 percent of 
the firm’s overall business costs. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
***statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
Table 3  Estimated Employment and Earnings Creation, by Year
Year Employment Earnings ($, millions)
Total credit taken
($, millions)
2005 378
(84, 672)
14.244
(−9.528, 38.016)
18.541
2006 430
(96, 764)
18.988
(−12.702, 50.678)
17.376
2007 469
(117, 833)
21.114
(−14.125, 56.353)
19.487
2008 511
(114, 907)
23.019
(−15.399, 61.437)
22.672
2009 484
(108, 860)
20.728
(−13.866, 55.322)
24.341
NOTE: Table entries in the second and third columns are estimated jobs and earnings created as a 
result of the R&D tax credit. The entries in parentheses are the lower and upper bounds of a 95 
percent confidence interval. The “credit taken” data are derived from tax return data, and hence 
differ slightly from the survey data reported in Table 1.
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effects in lowering overall business costs. 
Third, a significant proportion of the tax 
credits are capped, which means that 
on the margin these tax credits do not 
lower the costs of expanding Washington 
employment. Fourth, a significant 
proportion of the tax credits are awarded 
to non-export-based firms, which will 
have lower effects on overall Washington 
employment.   
These explanations point to ways 
to lower the cost per job created from 
this policy. In particular, targeting 
export-based firms with high multiplier 
effects, and making sure that incentives 
affect marginal costs to firms that are 
expanding, will help reduce the cost per 
job created.  Higher multiplier effects 
will be more likely if firms have stronger 
local supplier links. Finally, if the goal is 
job creation, directly tying the magnitude 
of the incentive to job creation provides a 
greater reason for firms to respond to the 
incentive with job creation.      
Notes
1. Dr. Raymond Wolfe of the NSF 
graciously assisted us in navigating the NSF 
data, and released the 2008 and 2009 data 
slightly early.
2. Note that many firms’ marginal credit 
ratio is 0, so that no simulated job creation 
occurs at these firms.
3. The fact that wages increased less than 
employment suggests that the credit had a 
negative impact on wages per employee. This 
finding is not surprising because one would 
assume that new hires make, on average, 
less than incumbent workers. In addition, 
lower-wage firms may have higher percentage 
effects of the tax credit on costs. 
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Françoise Carré and Chris Tilly
Part-Time and Short Hours 
in Retail in the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico 
How Institutions Matter
In sectors where full-time schedules 
do not dominate, total hours matter 
greatly for job quality. We explore hour 
levels and trends in retail trade, which is 
known for part-time work. We compare 
the United States, Canada, and Mexico, 
taking advantage of the fact that work 
hours regulations vary cross-nationally. 
By comparing retail hour levels and 
trends, we contribute insights into policy 
and regulatory impacts on job quality. 
Our analysis draws mainly on publicly 
available data from national statistical 
offices in the three countries; from 419 
field interviews with retail executives, 
managers, and workers in the United 
States and Mexico; and from secondary 
sources.
Retail Hours—Cause for  
Policy Concern 
The issue of insufficient hours is 
ubiquitous in U.S. retail. Schedules 
are driven by retailers’ extension of 
opening hours, and by wide swings in 
shopping flows throughout the day and 
week, as well as seasonally. Retail in the 
United States relies heavily on part-time 
workers, who increasingly are guaranteed 
very few weekly hours, but are expected 
to “flex up” to 40 hours on demand. 
Moreover, today even the full-time-hours 
guarantee falls below 40 hours, and often 
below 35. 
These patterns have significant 
implications for the workforce. Lower 
standard hours reduce the base level of 
weekly earnings that workers—full- and 
part-time—can rely upon. Additionally, 
retailers’ scheduling practices generate 
variability and unpredictability in 
individuals’ total hours and in the 
distribution of these hours. Part-timers 
receive few or no benefits and usually 
a lower hourly wage than full-time 
workers. For these reasons, retail 
work hours and the firm strategies and 
institutional factors that drive them 
warrant attention.
In each of the countries we examined, 
long and expanding hours of operation 
create two managerial goals: 1) control 
labor costs with lean staffing, and  2) 
closely match staffing levels to customer 
flow. However, in the United States and 
Canada, these twin goals lead retailers to 
shorten employee work hours and expand 
part-time jobs, whereas in Mexico they 
lead retailers to lengthen hours. 
The three countries provide a useful 
comparison. They are neighbors and 
share many of the same retail chains—
Wal-Mart is the largest retailer in both 
the United States and Mexico and is one 
of the top retailers in Canada as well. Yet 
the labor market and social protection 
institutions of the three countries are 
quite distinct, with important implications 
for hours of work. 
Contrasting Hours in Canada,  
the United States, and Mexico
We find differing levels and trends in 
retail hours across the three countries in 
recent decades. Table 1 provides average 
weekly hours levels; data are broadly 
comparable multiyear averages (see 
U.S. retail relies heavily on part-
time workers, who increasingly 
are guaranteed very few weekly 
hours, but are expected to “flex 
up” to 40 hours on demand.
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Carré and Tilly [2012a] for sources and 
definitions). Compared to the economy-
wide average, U.S. and Canadian retail 
employees work shorter hours, while 
Mexican retail workers put in longer 
hours. 
The United States has the shortest 
average hours—they are shorter than in 
Canada except in the grocery subsector. 
Mexico has the longest hours economy-
wide, and even longer hours in retail. 
Mexican statistics must be seen within 
the national context: our fieldwork 
indicates that Mexican retailers press 
workers to work unpaid additional 
hours. In the United States, supervisors, 
who are not subject to the overtime 
premium, work much longer hours than 
nonsupervisory workers; in Mexico, 
the reverse is true, consistent with a 
management regime built on extending 
worker hours. 
In Canada and the United States, 
1987–2009 time trends for employee 
hours are negative for total, retail, and 
grocery employment, but the negative 
time trend is more marked in Canada 
than in the United States: a loss of 1.8 
hours over 20 years after controlling 
for cyclical effects, as compared to the 
0.2 hour U.S. loss (see Carré and Tilly 
[2012b] for details).1 We lack detailed 
time series data on Mexico and thus did 
not make a parallel estimate of trends.
How Institutional Environment 
Matters: Three Patterns 
Patterns of hours reflect sector-specific 
strategies but also significant differences 
in institutional environments—notably 
between Mexico and its two northern 
neighbors, but also to some degree 
between the United States and Canada.
Retailers have parallel practices in 
Canada and the United States; they 
control unit labor costs by paying lower 
hourly wages and in most cases extending 
fewer benefits to part-time workers 
than to full-time workers. Still, these 
practices take place against a backdrop 
of institutional characteristics with 
significantly different implications. The 
U.S. institutional environment for retail 
jobs is best characterized as regulatory 
“flexibility.” Retail hours of operation 
are not regulated at the federal and state 
levels; there are few (and diminishing) 
local statutory limits on opening hours. 
Retail entry-level wages are pegged at or 
slightly above the minimum wage, which 
is low relative to the economy-wide 
median and has declined in real terms. 
Collective bargaining, which historically 
has improved compensation, covers a 
declining share of workers (reaching 5 
percent in retail and 17 percent in grocery 
in 2011). 
Canada’s institutional environment 
represents a form of “constrained 
flexibility.” Its industry regulation is 
broadly similar to that of the United 
States, but it has different norms in 
regard to labor standards and social 
protection. As provinces have relaxed 
their restrictions on Sunday and holiday 
opening, legal regulation of opening 
hours has moved in the same direction as 
in the United States, but it has changed 
more recently in Canada. The steeper 
1987–2009 decline in hours in Canada 
reflects adoption of these practices in 
Canadian retail starting in the 1980s, 
then accelerating in the 1990s, whereas 
these same practices had been long-
standing in the United States by the late 
1980s. Furthermore, in grocery retail 
and general merchandise, severe price 
competition also hit later. When it did, in 
the early 1990s, management in Canadian 
unionized grocery chains sought to 
reopen contracts, dissolve pattern 
bargaining, and redesign jobs (Kainer 
2002). These changes, entailing greater 
use of part-time workers, spread quickly. 
Today Canadian retail has high rates of 
part-time workers (35.5 percent of wage 
employment in 2004, compared to 28 
percent in the United States, although 
Canada uses a lower threshold, 30 hours).
Still, even by 2007, the end of our 
study period, Canadian retail hours 
were on the whole higher than in the 
United States, and the implications for 
workers were mitigated. Very short-
hour part-time work (less than 20 hours) 
appears to be less prevalent in Canada. 
Table 1  Average Weekly Hours for the United States, Canada, and Mexico 
(multiyear averages)
U.S. Canada Mexico
Total 
All private, nonsupervisory, 1987–2009 34.13
Total, all employees, 1987–2009 36.69
All private, all employees, 1998/2003/2008  
(Economic Census) 47.66
Retail
Nonsupervisory, 1987–2009 30.65
All employees, 1987–2009 33.04
All employees, 1998/2003/2008 (Economic Census) 51.57
Nonsupervisory, 1998/2003/2008 (Economic Census) 51.94
Grocery
Nonsupervisory, 1990–2009 31.08
All employees, 1990–2009 30.50
All employees, 1998/2003/2008 (Economic Census) 54.88
NOTE: Hours from Mexico’s Economic Census imputed by assuming 52 weeks of work a year, 
thus weekly hours may be underestimated.
SOURCE: Carré and Tilly (2012b).
Retailers in Canada and the 
United States control unit labor 
costs by paying lower hourly 
wages and extending fewer 
benefits to part-time workers.
In the United States, supervisors 
work much longer hours than 
nonsupervisory workers; in 
Mexico, the reverse is true.
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Moreover, the impacts of part-time 
work are buffered by nearly universal 
access to health insurance. Differential 
treatment does remain because several 
employer-based benefits are not readily 
available to part-time workers—namely 
employer pensions, paid time off, and 
supplemental health insurance—but 
the cost advantage to retailers of part-
time employment is reduced in Canada.  
Finally, Canadian retail has retained 
significant rates of collective bargaining 
coverage, boosting compensation. In 
2004, union coverage amounted to 15 
percent of retail employment and 42 
percent in grocery (compared to 6 and 18 
percent, respectively, in the United States 
that year). In recent years, provincial 
minimum wage levels have remained 
higher, relative to the average wage, than 
the U.S. federal minimum wage. 
In contrast, the institutional structure 
regulating Mexican retail jobs can be 
characterized as “unevenly regulated 
dualism.” While much of the retail 
industry in Mexico takes place in 
informal and family businesses, which 
typically evade regulation, the country 
has a growing number of modern retail 
outlets, including hypermarkets. Formal 
retail businesses face a regulatory regime 
quite distinct from that in the other two 
countries.
Mexican institutions motivate 
employers—especially retailers—to 
set longer hours. Four elements of the 
institutional environment of larger 
stores have a particular impact: 1) 
a long workweek, 2) the day-based 
minimum wage, 3) universal social 
insurance, and 4) weak unions and 
limited enforcement. Mexico’s full-time 
workweek is 48 hours (six days times 
eight hours), with overtime provisions 
only applying beyond this point. The 
minimum wage there is set by daily pay 
and not hourly pay. Mexican law also 
mandates universal social insurance 
(through employer contributions), though 
the level is low and workers with greater 
market power generally get plans above 
the minimum. The first three provisions 
weaken the incentive to use part-time 
employment: 1) the 48-hour workweek 
facilitates covering weekends without 
part-timers, 2) the minimum wage sets 
a daily pay floor that vitiates the cost 
advantage of short-hour workers if the 
wage level is close to the minimum, 
and 3) universal social insurance bars 
(at least as a matter of law) a strategy 
of excluding part-timers from the most 
expensive benefits. The daily wage, 
however, also sets an economic incentive 
to push workers to work unpaid hours 
beyond the statutory eight hours. Finally, 
the bulk of retail unions negotiate so-
called “protection” contracts (whereby 
corrupt union leadership colludes with 
management) that offer workers little if 
any representation or recourse against 
standards violations. 
In short, national institutional 
environments can shape employer 
incentives and thus worker hours with 
significant job quality implications. The 
Canadian and Mexican examples suggest 
possible U.S. policy options to mitigate 
the problems of short and variable 
hours—for example, instituting a daily 
as well as an hourly minimum wage 
would reduce employers’ incentives to 
create very short shifts (in a number of 
states, recently instituted “reporting pay” 
requirements that ensure a minimum 
pay when called into work should have 
similar effects); so would policies that 
reduce the cost differentials between full-
time and part-time workers. Given the 
importance of work hours as a job quality 
indicator in retail and other service 
work, these possibilities merit further 
exploration.
Notes
This research was funded through an 
Upjohn Policy grant. We thank the W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for providing funding for 
this research. For earlier and parallel research 
that also contributed to this work, we thank 
the Russell Sage Foundation, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the 
Fulbright Program. Special thanks to Diana 
Denham and Brandynn Holgate for excellent 
research assistance.  
1. In the grocery subsector, time trend 
begins in 1990.
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